Dynamic Bargaining in a Supply Chain with Asymmetric Demand Information

被引:81
作者
Feng, Qi [1 ]
Lai, Guoming [2 ]
Lu, Lauren Xiaoyuan [3 ]
机构
[1] Purdue Univ, Krannert Sch Management, W Lafayette, IN 47907 USA
[2] Univ Texas Austin, McCombs Sch Business, Austin, TX 78712 USA
[3] Univ N Carolina, Kenan Flagler Business Sch, Chapel Hill, NC 27599 USA
关键词
dynamic bargaining; asymmetric information; screening; signaling; forecasting accuracy; MECHANISM DESIGN; COST INFORMATION; MODEL; CONTRACTS; CAPACITY; PROCUREMENT; DELAY;
D O I
10.1287/mnsc.2014.1938
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
We analyze a dynamic bargaining game in which a seller and a buyer negotiate over quantity and payment to trade for a product. Both firms are impatient, and they make alternating offers until an agreement is reached. The buyer is privately informed about his type, which can be high or low: the high type's demand is stochastically larger than the low type's. In the dynamic negotiation process, the seller can screen, whereas the buyer can signal information through their offers, and the buyer has an endogenous and type-dependent reservation profit. With rational assumptions on the seller's belief structure, we characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the bargaining game. Interestingly, we find that both quantity distortion and information rent may be avoided depending on the firms' relative patience, and the seller may reach an agreement with either the high type or the low type first, or with both simultaneously. Furthermore, we explore our model to characterize the effect of demand forecasting accuracy on firm profitability. We find that improved demand forecast benefits the buyer but hurts the seller when the buyer's forecasting accuracy is low. However, once the buyer's forecasting accuracy exceeds a threshold, both firms will benefit from further improvement of the forecast. This observation makes an interesting contrast to previous findings based on the one-shot principal-agent model, in which improvement of forecasting accuracy mostly leads to a win-lose outcome for the two firms, and the buyer has an incentive to improve his forecasting accuracy only when it is extremely low.
引用
收藏
页码:301 / 315
页数:15
相关论文
共 43 条
[1]   STRATEGIC DELAY IN BARGAINING [J].
ADMATI, AR ;
PERRY, M .
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1987, 54 (03) :345-364
[2]  
[Anonymous], OPER RES
[3]  
Ausubel L. M, 2002, HDB GAME THEORY
[4]   BARGAINING AND THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT [J].
AUSUBEL, LM ;
DENECKERE, RJ .
ECONOMETRICA, 1992, 60 (03) :597-625
[5]   Auctions Versus Negotiations in Procurement: An Empirical Analysis [J].
Bajari, Patrick ;
McMillan, Robert ;
Tadelis, Steven .
JOURNAL OF LAW ECONOMICS & ORGANIZATION, 2009, 25 (02) :372-399
[6]   A BARGAINING MODEL WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION [J].
BIKHCHANDANI, S .
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1992, 59 (01) :187-203
[7]   THE NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION IN ECONOMIC MODELING [J].
BINMORE, K ;
RUBINSTEIN, A ;
WOLINSKY, A .
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1986, 17 (02) :176-188
[8]   Quantity discounts in single-period supply contracts with asymmetric demand information [J].
Burnetas, Apostolos ;
Gilbert, Stephen M. ;
Smith, Craig E. .
IIE TRANSACTIONS, 2007, 39 (05) :465-479
[9]   Procuring fast delivery: Sole sourcing with information asymmetry [J].
Cachon, Gerard P. ;
Zhang, Fuqiang .
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 2006, 52 (06) :881-896
[10]   Contracting to assure supply: How to share demand forecasts in a supply chain [J].
Cachon, GP ;
Lariviere, MA .
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 2001, 47 (05) :629-646