PMU Placement in Electric Transmission Networks for Reliable State Estimation Against False Data Injection Attacks

被引:50
作者
Yang, Qiang [1 ]
Jiang, Le [1 ]
Hao, Weijie [1 ]
Zhou, Bo [2 ]
Yang, Po [2 ]
Lv, Zhihan [3 ]
机构
[1] Zhejiang Univ, Coll Elect Engn, Hangzhou 310027, Peoples R China
[2] Liverpool John Moores Univ, Dept Comp Sci, Liverpool L3 3AF, Merseyside, England
[3] UCL, Dept Comp Sci, London WC1E 6EA, England
来源
IEEE INTERNET OF THINGS JOURNAL | 2017年 / 4卷 / 06期
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
Cyber attack; electric cyber-physical system (ECPS); phase measurement units (PMUs); state estimation; CYBER-PHYSICAL SECURITY; POWER-SYSTEMS; INFRASTRUCTURE; DEFENSE; GRIDS;
D O I
10.1109/JIOT.2017.2769134
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
Currently the false data injection (FDI) attack bring direct challenges in synchronized phase measurement unit (PMU) based network state estimation in wide-area measurement system, resulting in degraded system reliability and power supply security. This paper assesses the performance of state estimation in electric cyber-physical system paradigm considering the presence of FDI attacks. The adverse impact on network state estimation is evaluated through simulations for a range of FDI attack scenarios using IEEE 14-bus network model. In addition, an algorithmic solution is proposed to address the issue of additional PMU installation and placement with cyber security consideration and evaluated for a set of standard electric transmission networks (IEEE 14-bus, 30-bus, and 57-bus network). The numerical result confirms that the FDI attack can significantly degrade the state estimation and the cyber security can be improved by an appropriate placement of a limited number of additional PMUs.
引用
收藏
页码:1978 / 1986
页数:9
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