CEO compensation and banks' risk-taking during pre and post financial crisis periods

被引:15
作者
Shah, Syed Zulfiqar Ali [1 ]
Akbar, Saeed [2 ]
Liu, Jia [3 ]
Liu, Ziyu [1 ]
Cao, Sichen [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Warwick, Warwick Business Sch, Scarman Rd, Coventry CV4 7AL, W Midlands, England
[2] Hull Univ, Sch Business, Cottingham Rd, Kingston Upon Hull HU6 7RX, N Humberside, England
[3] Univ Salford, Salford Business Sch, Lady Hale Bldg, Salford M5 4WT, Lancs, England
关键词
Compensation; Risk-taking; Financial crisis; TARP; EXECUTIVE STOCK-OPTIONS; MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; FIRM; INDUSTRY; TARP; DEREGULATION; BEHAVIOR; POLICIES; BONUSES;
D O I
10.1016/j.ribaf.2017.07.089
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This study examines the impact of CEO compensation on banks' risk during both pre and postfinancial crisis periods. Our results suggest a negative relationship between CEO bonuses and banks' risk in the pre-financial crisis period. Similarly, restricted shares and options granted to CEOs in the post-financial crisis period also appear to decrease banks' risk. In contrast, we observe a positive influence of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) on banks' risk. Our results also show that the length of time to maturity of options influences banks' risk-taking behavior. Our findings have useful implications for formulating and regulating CEO compensation structure.
引用
收藏
页码:1489 / 1503
页数:15
相关论文
共 48 条
[1]   MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES AND CORPORATE-INVESTMENT AND FINANCING DECISIONS [J].
AGRAWAL, A ;
MANDELKER, GN .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 1987, 42 (04) :823-837
[2]  
[Anonymous], 456 FED RES BANK NEW
[3]   The relation between equity incentives and misreporting: The role of risk-taking incentives [J].
Armstrong, Christopher S. ;
Larcker, David F. ;
Ormazabal, Gaizka ;
Taylor, Daniel J. .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2013, 109 (02) :327-350
[4]   Executive stock options, differential risk-taking incentives, and firm value [J].
Armstrong, Christopher S. ;
Vashishtha, Rahul .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2012, 104 (01) :70-88
[5]   Competition, Bonuses, and Risk-taking in the Banking Industry [J].
Bannier, Christina E. ;
Feess, Eberhard ;
Packham, Natalie .
REVIEW OF FINANCE, 2013, 17 (02) :653-690
[6]  
Bebchuk L., 2004, Pay without Performance The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation
[7]  
Bebchuk L.A., 2010, YALE J REGUL, V27, P257
[8]   Executive compensation as an agency problem [J].
Bebchuk, LA ;
Fried, JA .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, 2003, 17 (03) :71-92
[9]   Compensation Vega, Deregulation, and Risk-Taking: Lessons from the US Banking Industry [J].
Belkhir, Mohamed ;
Chazi, Abdelaziz .
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING, 2010, 37 (9-10) :1218-1247
[10]  
Berndt Antje, 2010, 16175 NBER