CEO compensation and banks' risk-taking during pre and post financial crisis periods

被引:15
|
作者
Shah, Syed Zulfiqar Ali [1 ]
Akbar, Saeed [2 ]
Liu, Jia [3 ]
Liu, Ziyu [1 ]
Cao, Sichen [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Warwick, Warwick Business Sch, Scarman Rd, Coventry CV4 7AL, W Midlands, England
[2] Hull Univ, Sch Business, Cottingham Rd, Kingston Upon Hull HU6 7RX, N Humberside, England
[3] Univ Salford, Salford Business Sch, Lady Hale Bldg, Salford M5 4WT, Lancs, England
关键词
Compensation; Risk-taking; Financial crisis; TARP; EXECUTIVE STOCK-OPTIONS; MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; FIRM; INDUSTRY; TARP; DEREGULATION; BEHAVIOR; POLICIES; BONUSES;
D O I
10.1016/j.ribaf.2017.07.089
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This study examines the impact of CEO compensation on banks' risk during both pre and postfinancial crisis periods. Our results suggest a negative relationship between CEO bonuses and banks' risk in the pre-financial crisis period. Similarly, restricted shares and options granted to CEOs in the post-financial crisis period also appear to decrease banks' risk. In contrast, we observe a positive influence of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) on banks' risk. Our results also show that the length of time to maturity of options influences banks' risk-taking behavior. Our findings have useful implications for formulating and regulating CEO compensation structure.
引用
收藏
页码:1489 / 1503
页数:15
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