Rent-seeking government and endogenous takeoff in a Schumpeterian economy

被引：2

作者：

Chu, Angus C. ^{[1
]}

Furukawa, Yuichi ^{[2
]}

Wang, Xilin ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Macau, Dept Econ, Macau, Peoples R China

[2] Aichi Univ, Fac Econ, Nagoya, Aichi, Japan

[3] Fudan Univ, China Ctr Econ Studies, Sch Econ, Shanghai, Peoples R China

来源：

JOURNAL OF MACROECONOMICS | 2022年 / 72卷

基金：

中国博士后科学基金; 日本学术振兴会;

关键词：

Rent-seeking government; Endogenous takeoff; Industrialization; GROWTH; PRODUCTIVITY; POPULATION; INEQUALITY; INDUSTRY; MARKETS; WELFARE; MODELS; POLICY;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jmacro.2022.103399

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This study explores how the rent-seeking behavior of the government may impede economic development and delay industrialization. Introducing a rent-seeking government to a Schumpeterian growth model that features endogenous takeoff, we find that a more self-interested government engages in more rent-seeking taxation, which delays the economy's transition from pre-industrial stagnation to modern economic growth. Quantitatively, a completely self-interested government could have delayed industrialization, relative to a benevolent government, by about two centuries in the UK.

引用

页数：14