The aggregation of preferences: can we ignore the past?

被引：31

作者：

Zuber, Stephane ^{[1
,2
]}

机构：

[1] Catholic Univ Louvain, CORE, B-1348 Louvain, Belgium

[2] Catholic Univ Louvain, Chair Lhoist Berghmans Environm Econ, B-1348 Louvain, Belgium

来源：

THEORY AND DECISION | 2011年 / 70卷 / 03期

关键词：

Social welfare function; Aggregation of preferences; History independence; UTILITY FUNCTIONS; TIME PREFERENCE; RISK-AVERSION; UNCERTAINTY; GROWTH; ACCUMULATION; IMPATIENCE; RESOLUTION; EXISTENCE; WELFARE;

D O I：

10.1007/s11238-010-9225-4

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The article shows that a Paretian social welfare function can be history independent and time consistent only if a stringent set of conditions is verified. Individual utilities must be additive. The social welfare function must be a linear combination of these utilities. Social preferences are stationary only if, in addition, all individuals have the same constant discount rate. The results are implemented in two frameworks: deterministic dynamic choice and dynamic choice under uncertainty. The applications highlight that the conditions are unlikely to be met by individual preferences, and that they severely restrict social preferences.

引用

页码：367 / 384

页数：18

共 29 条

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[3]

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