Investment externalities in models of fire sales

被引：1
|
作者：
Kurlat, Pablo [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Southern Calif, Dept Econ, 3620 S Vermont Ave, Los Angeles, CA 90089 USA
来源：
JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS | 2021年 / 122卷
基金：
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词：
Fire sales; Pecuniary externality; Asymmetric information; CAPITAL FLOWS; MARKET; LIQUIDITY; DEBT; EQUILIBRIUM; VOLATILITY; LEMONS;
D O I：
10.1016/j.jmoneco.2021.07.005
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
Two alternative models of fire sales that yield the same aggregate predictions have different normative implications. If fire sales result from marginal misallocation, a pecuniary externality leads to ex-ante overinvestment. If they result from asymmetric information, the overinvestment result is reversed. However, there may be a tradeoff between present and future underinvestment. Ex-ante macroprudential policy may need to treat different types of investment differently, but ex-post intervention is useful in both cases. (c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：102 / 118
页数：17
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