Ad valorem taxes and the fiscal gap in federations

被引：7

作者：

Kotsogiannis, Christos ^{[1
]}

Martinez, Diego ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Exeter, Sch Business & Econ, Dept Econ, Streatham Court EX4 4PU, England

[2] Univ Pablo Olavide, Dept Econ, Seville 41013, Spain

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2008年 / 99卷 / 03期

关键词：

ad valorem taxes; fiscal gap; externalities; fiscal federalism;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2007.09.019

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper shows that the federal government can always achieve the second-best optimum of public good provision, but a precise evaluation of the fiscal gap requires an explicit consideration of the underlying fundamentals of the federal economy. (C) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：431 / 434

页数：4

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[3]

Keen Michael, 1996, INT TAX PUBLIC FINAN, V3, P137

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Keen, MJ ;

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Kotsogiannis, C ;

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ECONOMICS LETTERS, 2002, 76 (02) :281-287

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