Dividends on Unearned Shares and Corporate Payout Policy: An Analysis of Dividend Equivalent Rights

被引:0
作者
Jia, Z. Tingting [1 ]
Chance, Don M. [2 ]
机构
[1] Bucknell Univ, One Dent Dr, Lewisburg, PA 17837 USA
[2] Louisiana State Univ, 2909 Business Educ Complex North, Baton Rouge, LA 70803 USA
关键词
Dividend equivalent; executive compensation; corporate governance; dividend policy; STOCK OPTION AWARDS; CEO PAY; FIRM; COMPENSATION; PERFORMANCE; INCENTIVES; COMPANIES; BEHAVIOR; PLANS;
D O I
10.1142/S2010139222500136
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We investigate a little-known executive compensation device called dividend equivalents, which are provisions on some options and performance-based equity awards permitting executives to receive dividends on shares not owned and which they may ultimately never own. We find that up to 30% of sample firms have had this policy. While dividend equivalents may appear to exacerbate agency problems, they have a positive impact on cash holdings and help align incentives - firms with dividend equivalent policies tend to pay dividends, and firms that make dividend equivalent payments tend to pay higher dividends and keep lower excess cash.
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页数:42
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