Authoritarian institutions and the survival of autocrats

被引:636
作者
Gandhi, Jennifer [1 ]
Przeworski, Adam
机构
[1] Emory Univ, Atlanta, GA 30322 USA
[2] NYU, New York, NY USA
关键词
authoritarianism; autocracy; dictatorship; leaders; survival;
D O I
10.1177/0010414007305817
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Why do some autocrats survive for decades, and others fall soon after taking power? The authors argue that when authoritarian rulers need to solicit the cooperation of outsiders or deter the threat of rebellion, they rely on political institutions. Partisan legislatures incorporate potential opposition forces, giving them a stake in the ruler's survival. By broadening the basis of support for autocrats, these institutions lengthen their tenures. An analysis of all authoritarian rulers in power during the 1946-1996 period provides evidence of the effect of nominally democratic institutions on their political survival.
引用
收藏
页码:1279 / 1301
页数:23
相关论文
共 63 条
  • [1] [Anonymous], CROSS NATL TIME SERI
  • [2] [Anonymous], THESIS U TEXAS AUSTI
  • [3] [Anonymous], 1994, POLITICAL PARTIES MI
  • [4] [Anonymous], EC POLITICS
  • [5] [Anonymous], DATABASE POLITICAL I
  • [6] [Anonymous], WORLD EC OUTL
  • [7] [Anonymous], E GIEREK PRZERWANA D
  • [8] [Anonymous], ANN M AM POL SCI ASS
  • [9] BANKS A, 1973, POLITICAL HDB WORLD
  • [10] Barros Robert., 2002, CONSTITUTIONALISM DI