The Impact of Federal Preemption of State Antipredatory Lending Laws on the Foreclosure Crisis

被引:19
|
作者
Ding, Lei [1 ]
Quercia, Roberto G. [2 ]
Reid, Carolina K. [3 ]
White, Alan M. [4 ]
机构
[1] Wayne State Univ, Dept Urban Studies & Planning, Detroit, MI 48202 USA
[2] Univ N Carolina, Ctr Community Capital, Chapel Hill, NC 27514 USA
[3] Fed Reserve Bank San Francisco, Res Grp, Community Dev Dept, San Francisco, CA USA
[4] Valparaiso Univ, Sch Law, Valparaiso, IN 46383 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1002/pam.21604
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
State antipredatory lending laws (APLs) are designed to protect borrowers against predatory lending that can increase the risk of default and deplete the home equity held by borrowers. Federal regulators instituted preemption that limited the scope and reach of state antipredatory lending regulations for certain lenders. Based on the variation in state laws and the variation in the regulatory environment among lenders, this paper identifies the effects of federal preemption of state APLs on the quality of mortgages originated by preempted lenders. The results provide evidence of a relatively higher increase in default risk among loans exempted from strong state antipredatory laws. These results are most robust among refinance mortgages with adjustable interest ratesa large and highly dynamic market in the period of analysis. The findings provide initial evidence that preemption of state mortgage lending regulations may result in an increase in mortgage default risk, thus limiting consumer protection in the residential mortgage market.
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页码:367 / +
页数:23
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