Formal security analysis of LoRaWAN

被引:69
作者
Eldefrawy, Mohamed [1 ]
Butun, Ismail [1 ]
Pereira, Nuno [2 ]
Gidlund, Mikael [1 ]
机构
[1] Mid Sweden Univ, Informat Syst & Technol, Sundsvall, Sweden
[2] Polytech Porto IPP, Sch Engn DEI ISEP, Porto, Portugal
关键词
LoRaWAN; IoT; Scyther verification;
D O I
10.1016/j.comnet.2018.11.017
中图分类号
TP3 [计算技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
Recent Low Power Wide Area Networks (LPWAN) protocols are receiving increased attention from industry and academia to offer accessibility for Internet of Things (IoT) connected remote sensors and actuators. In this work, we present a formal study of LoRaWAN security, an increasingly popular technology, which defines the structure and operation of LPWAN networks based on the LoRa physical layer. There are previously known security vulnerabilities in LoRaWAN that lead to the proposal of several improvements, some already incorporated into the latest protocol specification. Our analysis of LoRaWAN security uses Scyther, a formal security analysis tool and focuses on the key exchange portion of versions 1.0 (released in 2015) and 1.1 (the latest, released in 2017). For version 1.0, which is still the most widely deployed version of LoRaWAN, we show that our formal model allowed to uncover weaknesses that can be related to previously reported vulnerabilities. Our model did not find weaknesses in the latest version of the protocol (v1.1), and we discuss what this means in practice for the security of LoRaWAN as well as important aspects of our model and tools employed that should be considered. The Scyther model developed provides realistic models for LoRaWAN v1.0 and v1.1 that can be used and extended to formally analyze, inspect, and explore the security features of the protocols. This, in turn, can clarify the methodology for achieving secrecy, integrity, and authentication for designers and developers interested in these LPWAN standards. We believe that our model and discussion of the protocols security properties are beneficial for both researchers and practitioners. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that presents a formal security analysis of LoRaWAN. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:328 / 339
页数:12
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