Structuring and restructuring sovereign debt: The role of a bankruptcy regime

被引:39
作者
Bolton, Patrick [1 ]
Jeanne, Olivier [2 ]
机构
[1] Columbia Univ, Natl Bur Econ Res, Ctr Econ Policy Res, New York, NY 10027 USA
[2] Int Monetary Fund, Washington, DC 20431 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1086/528759
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In an environment characterized by weak contractual enforcement, sovereign lenders can enhance the likelihood of repayment by making their claims more difficult to restructure ex post. We show, however, that competition for repayment between lenders may result in a sovereign debt that is excessively difficult to restructure in equilibrium. This inefficiency may be alleviated by a suitably designed bankruptcy regime that facilitates debt restructuring.
引用
收藏
页码:901 / 924
页数:24
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