The significance of Kant's mere thoughts

被引:3
作者
Leech, Jessica [1 ]
机构
[1] Kings Coll London, Dept Philosophy, London, England
来源
INQUIRY-AN INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY | 2024年 / 67卷 / 06期
关键词
Cognition; Kant; objective validity; thought; transcendental ideas; unschematized categories;
D O I
10.1080/0020174X.2021.1938903
中图分类号
B82 [伦理学(道德学)];
学科分类号
摘要
Kant distinguishes cognition and thought. Mere thoughts do not conform to the conditions that Kant places on cognition and hence do not represent objects of experience. They are, nevertheless, intelligible, and play a vital role in our mental and moral lives. I offer the beginnings of an account of mere thought using Kant's resources. I consider four key cases of intelligible representations that lack objective validity: unschematized categories; transcendental ideas; philosophical concepts; thoughts that violate principles of the understanding.
引用
收藏
页码:1403 / 1433
页数:31
相关论文
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