Experimentation, Patents, and Innovation

被引：18

作者：

Acemoglu, Daron ^{[1
]}

Bimpikis, Kostas ^{[2
]}

Ozdaglar, Asuman ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] MIT, Dept Econ, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA

[2] MIT, Ctr Operat Res, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA

[3] MIT, Dept Elect Engn & Comp Sci, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS | 2011年 / 3卷 / 01期

关键词：

CONTINUOUS-TIME; GAMES; WAR; INFORMATION; MODEL;

D O I：

10.1257/mic.3.1.37

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper studies a simple model of experimentation and innovation. Our analysis suggests that patents improve the allocation of resources by encouraging rapid experimentation and efficient ex post transfer of knowledge. Each firm receives a signal on the success probability of a project and decides when to experiment. Successes can be copied. First, we assume that signal qualities are the same. Symmetric equilibria involve delayed and staggered experimentation, whereas the optimal allocation never involves delays and may involve simultaneous experimentation. Appropriately designed patents implement the optimal allocation. Finally, we discuss the case when signals differ and are private information. (JEL D82, D83, O31, O33, O34)

引用

页码：37 / 77

页数：41

共 31 条

[1] A MODEL OF GROWTH THROUGH CREATIVE DESTRUCTION [J].