Does shareholder litigation affect the corporate information environment?

被引：15

作者：

Le, Nhan ^{[1
]}

Nguyen, Duc Duy ^{[2
]}

Sila, Vathunyoo ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Australian Natl Univ, Canberra, ACT, Australia

[2] Kings Coll London, London, England

[3] Univ Edinburgh, Edinburgh, Midlothian, Scotland

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL MARKETS | 2021年 / 56卷

关键词：

Shareholder litigation; Universal demand laws; Information environment; Agency theory; Managerial discretion; STOCK-PRICE INFORMATIVENESS; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS; INVESTMENT SENSITIVITY; VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE; LIQUIDITY BIASES; GOVERNANCE; FIRMS; RISK; LAW;

D O I：

10.1016/j.finmar.2020.100600

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

Using the staggered adoption of universal demand (UD) laws in the United States, we show that the reduction in shareholder litigation risk deteriorates firms' stock price informativeness. This reduction in stock price informativeness is due to firms changing the way they invest rather than obfuscating or withholding firm-specific information. We also show that the reduction in litigation risk is associated with higher investment-price sensitivity. Overall, despite causing a deterioration in firms' information environment, the reduction in litigation risk does not appear to harm shareholder wealth. Our paper offers novel insights into the net economic benefits of shareholder litigation laws. (C) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页数：24

共 88 条

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