A generalized Tullock contest

被引：60
作者：
Chowdhury, Subhasish M. [1 ,2 ]
Sheremeta, Roman M. [3 ]
机构：
[1] Univ E Anglia, Sch Econ, Ctr Competit Policy, Norwich NR4 7TJ, Norfolk, England
[2] Univ E Anglia, Ctr Behav & Expt Social Sci, Norwich NR4 7TJ, Norfolk, England
[3] Chapman Univ, Argyros Sch Business & Econ, Orange, CA 92866 USA
来源：
PUBLIC CHOICE | 2011年 / 147卷 / 3-4期
关键词：
Rent-seeking; Contest; Spillover; RENT-SEEKING; SUCCESS FUNCTIONS; INFORMATION; AUCTION;
D O I：
10.1007/s11127-010-9636-3
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We construct a generalized Tullock contest under complete information where contingent upon winning or losing, the payoff of a player is a linear function of prizes, own effort, and the effort of the rival. This structure nests a number of existing contests in the literature and can be used to analyze new types of contests. We characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium and show that small parameter modifications may lead to substantially different types of contests and hence different equilibrium effort levels.
引用
收藏
页码：413 / 420
页数：8
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