Constrained Consensus for Bargaining in Dynamic Coalitional TU Games

被引：0

作者：

Nedic, Angelia ^{[1
]}

Bauso, Dario ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Illinois, Ind & Enterprise Syst Engn Dept, Urbana, IL 61801 USA

[2] Univ Palermo, Informat Meccan, Dipartimento Ingegneria Chim Gestionale, I-90128 Palermo, Italy

来源：

2011 50TH IEEE CONFERENCE ON DECISION AND CONTROL AND EUROPEAN CONTROL CONFERENCE (CDC-ECC) | 2011年

关键词：

COOPERATIVE GAMES; CONVEX-OPTIMIZATION; ALGORITHMS; NETWORKS; CORE;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];

学科分类号：

0812 ;

摘要：

We consider a sequence of transferable utility (TU) games where, at each time, the characteristic function is a random vector with realizations restricted to some set of values. We assume that the players in the game interact only with their neighbors, where the neighbors may vary over time. The main contributions of the paper are the definition of a robust (coalitional) TU game and the development of a distributed bargaining protocol. We prove the convergence with probability 1 of the bargaining protocol to a random allocation that lies in the core of the robust game under some mild conditions on the players' communication graphs.

引用

页码：229 / 234

页数：6