Political Capital: An Analysis of Congress Voting on the Financial Regulations

被引：0
作者：
Hao, Xiaoting [1 ]
Kim, Yong-Cheol [1 ]
Lim, Yuree [2 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Wisconsin, Lubar Sch Business, POB 742, Milwaukee, WI 53201 USA
[2] Univ Wisconsin, Coll Business, La Crosse, WI 54601 USA
来源：
ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL STUDIES | 2019年 / 48卷 / 06期
关键词：
Political capital; Public rent-seeking; Financial regulations; REVOLVING-DOOR; CONNECTIONS; ECONOMY;
D O I：
10.1111/ajfs.12282
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
We find that members of the House of Representatives who vote for deregulation are more likely to be employed in the private sector after leaving Congress than those who do not vote for deregulation. An analysis of voting behavior in a major financial regulation-the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999-shows that representatives use voting to enhance their careers. The results are consistent with politicians' public rent-seeking and show that political capital is as valuable for politicians as it is for companies.
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页码：869 / 892
页数：24
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