Third-Party Signals in Crowdfunded Microfinance: The Role of Microfinance Institutions

被引:45
作者
Anglin, Aaron H. [1 ]
Short, Jeremy C. [2 ]
Ketchen, David J., Jr. [3 ]
Allison, Thomas H. [4 ]
McKenny, Aaron F. [5 ]
机构
[1] Texas Christian Univ, Dept Entrepreneurship & Innovat, Ft Worth, TX 76129 USA
[2] Univ Oklahoma, Price Coll Business, Tom Love Div Entrepreneurship & Econ Dev, Norman, OK 73019 USA
[3] Auburn Univ, Dept Management, Harbert Coll Business, Auburn, AL 36849 USA
[4] Washington State Univ, Carson Coll Business, Dept Management Informat Syst & Entrepreneurship, Pullman, WA 99164 USA
[5] Univ Cent Florida, Coll Business Adm, Dept Management, Orlando, FL 32816 USA
关键词
microfinance; crowdfunding; signaling theory; STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT RESEARCH; RELATIVE IMPORTANCE; DECISION-MAKING; PERFORMANCE; INVESTMENT; REPUTATION; NETWORKS; MATTER; MODEL; POOR;
D O I
10.1177/1042258719839709
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Crowdfunded microfinance research has routinely examined how campaign characteristics drive funding to crowdfunding campaigns but has neglected to examine the critical role of the microfinance institution (MFI). We leverage signaling theory to contend that entrepreneurs' MFI affiliation is a salient third-party signal that shapes the performance of their crowdfunding campaign and examine how the financial and social performance of MFIs drive campaign funding. Our examination of 220,649 loans paired 173 MFIs supports our arguments. We provide insight into the importance of third-party signals in crowdfunding and into how investors seek to balance social motives with financial concerns in crowdfunded microfinance.
引用
收藏
页码:623 / 644
页数:22
相关论文
共 64 条
  • [21] INVESTMENT BANK REPUTATION, INFORMATION PRODUCTION, AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION
    CHEMMANUR, TJ
    FULGHIERI, P
    [J]. JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 1994, 49 (01) : 57 - 79
  • [22] Chen GL, 2008, ACAD MANAGE J, V51, P954
  • [23] Signaling in science-based IPOs: The combined effect of affiliation with prestigious universities, underwriters, and venture capitalists
    Colombo, Massimo G.
    Meoli, Michele
    Vismara, Silvio
    [J]. JOURNAL OF BUSINESS VENTURING, 2019, 34 (01) : 141 - 177
  • [24] Signaling Theory: A Review and Assessment
    Connelly, Brian L.
    Certo, S. Trevis
    Ireland, R. Duane
    Reutzel, Christopher R.
    [J]. JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT, 2011, 37 (01) : 39 - 67
  • [25] Unsubsidized microfinance institutions
    D'Espallier, Bert
    Hudon, Marek
    Szafarz, Ariane
    [J]. ECONOMICS LETTERS, 2013, 120 (02) : 174 - 176
  • [26] Microfinance and Financial Performance
    Daher, Lama
    Le Saout, Erwan
    [J]. STRATEGIC CHANGE-BRIEFINGS IN ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE, 2013, 22 (1-2): : 31 - 45
  • [27] THIRD PARTY EMPLOYMENT BRANDING: HUMAN CAPITAL INFLOWS AND OUTFLOWS FOLLOWING "BEST PLACES TO WORK" CERTIFICATIONS
    Dineen, Brian R.
    Allen, David G.
    [J]. ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL, 2016, 59 (01) : 90 - 112
  • [28] A Review and Road Map of Entrepreneurial Equity Financing Research: Venture Capital, Corporate Venture Capital, Angel Investment, Crowdfunding, and Accelerators
    Drover, Will
    Busenitz, Lowell
    Matusik, Sharon
    Townsend, David
    Anglin, Aaron
    Dushnitsky, Gary
    [J]. JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT, 2017, 43 (06) : 1820 - 1853
  • [29] Contracting, signaling, and moral hazard: a model of entrepreneurs, 'angels,' and venture capitalists
    Elitzur, R
    Gavious, A
    [J]. JOURNAL OF BUSINESS VENTURING, 2003, 18 (06) : 709 - 725
  • [30] Does the Classic Microfinance Model Discourage Entrepreneurship Among the Poor? Experimental Evidence from India
    Field, Erica
    Pande, Rohini
    Papp, John
    Rigol, Natalia
    [J]. AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2013, 103 (06) : 2196 - 2226