Consumer Ruthlessness and Mortgage Default during the 2007 to 2009 Housing Bust

被引:53
作者
Bhutta, Neil [1 ]
Dokko, Jane [1 ,3 ]
Shan, Hui [2 ]
机构
[1] Fed Reserve Board, Washington, DC 20006 USA
[2] Goldman Sachs & Co, New York, NY USA
[3] Brookings Inst, Washington, DC 20036 USA
关键词
LOSS AVERSION; HETEROGENEITY; FORECLOSURE; BEHAVIOR; OPTIONS; EQUITY; MARKET; STATES;
D O I
10.1111/jofi.12523
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
From 2007 to 2009 U.S. house prices plunged and mortgage defaults surged. While ostensibly consistent with widespread ruthless default, analysis of detailed mortgage and house price data indicates that borrowers do not walk away until they are deeply underwaterfar deeper than traditional models predict. The evidence suggests that lender recourse is not the major driver of this result. We argue that emotional and behavioral factors play an important role in decisions to continue paying. Borrower reluctance to walk away implies that the moral hazard cost of default as a form of social insurance may be lower than suspected.
引用
收藏
页码:2433 / 2466
页数:34
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