The cardinality objection to David Lewis's modal realism

被引：11

作者：

Pruss, AR ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Pittsburgh, Dept Philosophy, Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA

来源：

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES | 2001年 / 104卷 / 02期

关键词：

Modal Realism; Cardinality Objection;

D O I：

10.1023/A:1010304927119

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

According to David Lewis's extreme modal realism, every way that a world could be is a way that some concretely existing physical world really is. But if the worlds are physical entities, then there should be a set of all worlds, whereas I show that in fact the collection of all possible worlds is not a set. The latter conclusion remains true even outside of the Lewisian framework.

引用

页码：169 / 178

页数：10