The Multiplicity of Explanation in Cognitive Science

被引：1

作者：

Gervais, Raoul ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Antwerp, Antwerp, Belgium

来源：

FOUNDATIONS OF SCIENCE | 2021年 / 26卷 / 04期

关键词：

Explanation; Cognitive science; Cognitive architecture; Mechanisms; Inference; MODELS;

D O I：

10.1007/s10699-020-09653-5

中图分类号：

N09 [自然科学史]; B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ; 010108 ; 060207 ; 060305 ; 0712 ;

摘要：

In this paper, I argue that explaining cognitive behavior can be achieved through what I call hybrid explanatory inferences: inferences that posit mechanisms, but also draw on observed regularities. Moreover, these inferences can be used to achieve unification, in the sense developed by Allen Newel in his work on cognitive architectures. Thus, it seems that explanatory pluralism and unification do not rule out each other in cognitive science, but rather that the former represents a way to achieve the latter.

引用

页码：1089 / 1104

页数：16

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