A Comprehensive Analysis of LoRaWAN Key Security Models and Possible Attack Solutions

被引:3
作者
Ntshabele, Koketso [1 ]
Isong, Bassey [1 ]
Gasela, Naison [1 ]
Abu-Mahfouz, Adnan M. [2 ]
机构
[1] North West Univ, Comp Sci Dept, ZA-2745 Mafikeng, South Africa
[2] Council Sci & Ind Res CSIR, ZA-0184 Pretoria, South Africa
关键词
IoT; LoRaWAN; LPWAN; key security; attacks; IOT;
D O I
10.3390/math10193421
中图分类号
O1 [数学];
学科分类号
0701 ; 070101 ;
摘要
Low-Power Wide-Area Network (LPWAN) is a wireless WAN technology that connects low-powered and low-bandwidth devices with low bit rates atop Long Ranges (LoRa). It is characterized by improved scalability, wide area coverage, and low power consumption, which are beneficial to resource-constrained devices on the Internet of Things (IoT) for effective communication and security. Security in Long-Range Wide-Area Networks (LoRaWAN) widely employs Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 128-bit symmetric encryption as the accepted security standard for a key generation that secures communication and entities. However, designing an efficient key manifestation and management model is still a challenge as different designs are based on different research objectives. To date, there is no global and well-accepted LoRaWAN security model for all applications. Thus, there is a need to continually improve the LoRaWAN security model. This paper, therefore, performed an in-depth analysis of some existing LoRaWAN key security models to identify security challenges affecting these security models and assess the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed solutions. The goal is to improve some of the existing LoRaWAN security models by analysing and bringing together several challenges that affect them. Several relevant studies were collected and analysed; the analysis shows that though there are few research works in this area, several existing LoRaWAN security models are not immune to attacks. Symmetry encryption is found to be the most used approach to manage key security due to its less computational operations. Moreover, it is possible to improve existing key security models in LPWAN with consideration of the resource constrained. Again, trusted third parties for key management were also widely used to defend against possible attacks and minimize operational complexities. We, therefore, recommend the design of lightweight and less complex LPWAN security models to sustain the lifespan of LPWAN devices.
引用
收藏
页数:19
相关论文
共 31 条
[1]   Rescuing LoRaWAN 1.0 [J].
Avoine, Gildas ;
Ferreira, Loic .
FINANCIAL CRYPTOGRAPHY AND DATA SECURITY, FC 2018, 2018, 10957 :253-271
[2]  
Bahashwan Abdullah Ahmed, 2021, Advances on Smart and Soft Computing. Proceedings of ICACIn 2020. Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing (AISC 1188), P341, DOI 10.1007/978-981-15-6048-4_30
[3]   Analysis of LoRaWAN v1.1 Security [J].
Butun, Ismail ;
Pereira, Nuno ;
Gidlund, Mikael .
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 4TH ACM MOBIHOC WORKSHOP ON EXPERIENCES WITH THE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF SMART OBJECTS: SMARTOBJECTS'18, 2018,
[4]   Security Risk Analysis of LoRaWAN and Future Directions [J].
Butun, Ismail ;
Pereira, Nuno ;
Gidlund, Mikael .
FUTURE INTERNET, 2019, 11 (01)
[5]  
Choi J, 2016, ASIAPAC SIGN INFO PR
[6]   Security of LoRaWAN v1.1 in Backward Compatibility Scenarios [J].
Donmez, Tahsin C. M. ;
Nigussie, Ethiopia .
15TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MOBILE SYSTEMS AND PERVASIVE COMPUTING (MOBISPC 2018) / THE 13TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON FUTURE NETWORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS (FNC-2018) / AFFILIATED WORKSHOPS, 2018, 134 :51-58
[7]   Formal security analysis of LoRaWAN [J].
Eldefrawy, Mohamed ;
Butun, Ismail ;
Pereira, Nuno ;
Gidlund, Mikael .
COMPUTER NETWORKS, 2019, 148 :328-339
[8]  
Froiz-Miguez I., 2021, ENG PROC, V7, P18, DOI [10.3390/engproc2021007018, DOI 10.3390/ENGPROC2021007018]
[9]   A Malicious Behavior Awareness and Defense Countermeasure Based on LoRaWAN Protocol [J].
Gao, Shu-Yang ;
Li, Xiao-Hong ;
Ma, Mao-De .
SENSORS, 2019, 19 (23)
[10]   An Enhanced Key Management Scheme for LoRaWAN [J].
Han, Jialuo ;
Wang, Jidong .
CRYPTOGRAPHY, 2018, 2 (04) :1-12