Combining 'incompatible' foreign policy explanations: how a realist can borrow from constructivism

According to perspectivism, models and their explanations can be put 'next to each other' and can thus put one another into perspective, but they can hardly compete or, even less, be combined. The question whether such combination is allowed is demonstrated to have deep epistemological roots. Unfortunately, perspectivism easily leads to the compart-mentalisation of research communities and a reduced interest in the real world. As argued here, seemingly 'incompatible' models or theories can be made to compete through conscious effort by the researcher, and eventually their effects may restrain or reinforce one another in specific explanations. Such combination - in this case realism borrowing from constructivism - is illustrated by an explanation of the puzzle why the German great power is cautious, while the smaller Sweden is today hawkish in relation to Russia (the Ukraine 2014 conflict). In fact, combination may help bridge the much debated 'actor structure' cleavage in IR.