A simple model of voice

被引:39
作者
Banerjee, A [1 ]
Somanathan, R
机构
[1] MIT, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA
[2] Univ Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1162/003355301556383
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We think of voice as a means of information aggregation within groups operating in a variety of settings. We explore how the characteristics of groups and their leaders influence voice. In relatively homogeneous groups, members farthest away from the leader have the best incentives to provide information, and their voice tends to moderate policy decisions. In large heterogeneous groups where leaders cannot identify individual members, the possibilities for informational exchange are severely limited, and any communication that exists pushes policies farther to the extreme.
引用
收藏
页码:189 / 227
页数:39
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