CEO Risk-taking Incentives and Bank Loan Syndicate Structure

被引:7
作者
Chen, Liqiang [1 ]
机构
[1] St Marys Univ, Sobey Sch Business, Dept Finance, IS & MS, Halifax, NS B3H 3C3, Canada
关键词
risk-taking incentives; syndicate loans; STOCK OPTION PORTFOLIOS; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; CREDITOR RIGHTS; AGENCY COSTS; REPUTATION; DEBT; COMPENSATION; EQUITY; INFORMATION; INVESTMENT;
D O I
10.1111/jbfa.12087
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This paper investigates the effects of a borrowing firm's CEO risk-taking incentives on the structure of the firm's syndicated loans. When CEO risk-taking incentives are high, syndicates are structured to facilitate better due diligence and monitoring efforts. These syndicates have a smaller number of total lenders and are more concentrated, and lead arrangers will retain a greater portion of the loan. Moreover, CEO risk-taking incentives have a lesser effect on the syndicate structure when lead arrangers have a good reputation and a prior lending relationship with a borrowing firm, while they have a greater effect on the syndicate structure when borrowing firms have low information transparency, are financially distressed or have low growth prospects.
引用
收藏
页码:1269 / 1308
页数:40
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