Debt-reducing exchange offers

被引：14

作者：

Lie, E ^{[1
]}

Lie, HJ

McConnell, JJ

机构：

[1] Coll William & Mary, Sch Business Adm, Williamsburg, VA 23187 USA

[2] Purdue Univ, Krannert Sch Management, W Lafayette, IN 47907 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE | 2001年 / 7卷 / 02期

关键词：

debt-reducing exchange offers; financial distress; Chapter; 11;

D O I：

10.1016/S0929-1199(01)00019-0

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

Announcements of debt-reducing exchange offers are associated with a negative average stock price reaction. We address two questions: Why do firms undertake debt-reducing exchange offers? And, what is the information conveyed by such offers? The answers are interrelated: Debt-reducing exchange offers are undertaken by financially weak firms in an effort to stave off further financial distress and, thereby, preserve value for shareholders. A successfully completed exchange offer significantly reduces the likelihood that a firm will enter Chapter 11. Announcements of debt-reducing exchange offers apparently contain two pieces of information: (1) the firm is financially weaker than would have been apparent from other publicly available information, and (2) management is attempting to preserve value for shareholders. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：179 / 207

页数：29

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