A novel experiment is used to show that the effect of a policy on the level of cooperation is greater when it is chosen democratically by the subjects than when it is exogenously imposed. In contrast to the previous literature, our experimental design allows us to control for selection effects (e.g., those who choose the policy may be affected differently by it). Our finding implies that democratic institutions may affect behavior directly in addition to having effects through the choice of policies. Our findings have implications for the generalizability of the results of randomized policy interventions. (JEL C91, D02, D12, D72)
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Interamer Dev Bank, Washington, DC 20577 USAInteramer Dev Bank, Washington, DC 20577 USA
Ibarraran, Pablo
Kluve, Jochen
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Humboldt Univ, Empir Labor Econ, Berlin, Germany
RWI Leibniz Inst Econ Res, Berlin Off, Munich, GermanyInteramer Dev Bank, Washington, DC 20577 USA
Kluve, Jochen
Ripani, Laura
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Interamer Dev Bank, Washington, DC 20577 USAInteramer Dev Bank, Washington, DC 20577 USA
Ripani, Laura
Shady, David Rosas
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Interamer Dev Bank, Washington, DC 20577 USAInteramer Dev Bank, Washington, DC 20577 USA
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Care of Hari R, CALTECH, Div Humanities & Social Sci, Pasadena, CA 91125 USACare of Hari R, CALTECH, Div Humanities & Social Sci, Pasadena, CA 91125 USA