Institutions and Behavior: Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Democracy

被引:196
|
作者
Dal Bo, Pedro [1 ,2 ]
Foster, Andrew [1 ]
Putterman, Louis [1 ]
机构
[1] Brown Univ, Dept Econ, Providence, RI 02912 USA
[2] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
来源
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2010年 / 100卷 / 05期
关键词
PRISONERS-DILEMMA; VOTER PARTICIPATION; COORDINATION GAMES; SOCIAL PREFERENCES; COOPERATION; IMPACT; INDUCTION; TRANSFERS; CARROT; STICK;
D O I
10.1257/aer.100.5.2205
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
A novel experiment is used to show that the effect of a policy on the level of cooperation is greater when it is chosen democratically by the subjects than when it is exogenously imposed. In contrast to the previous literature, our experimental design allows us to control for selection effects (e.g., those who choose the policy may be affected differently by it). Our finding implies that democratic institutions may affect behavior directly in addition to having effects through the choice of policies. Our findings have implications for the generalizability of the results of randomized policy interventions. (JEL C91, D02, D12, D72)
引用
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页码:2205 / 2229
页数:25
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