Dissecting bankruptcy frictions

被引:26
作者
Dou, Winston Wei [1 ]
Taylor, Lucian A. [1 ]
Wang, Wei [2 ]
Wang, Wenyu [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Penn, Finance Dept, Wharton Sch, 2318 Steinberg Dietrich Hall,3620 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA
[2] Queens Univ, Stephen JR Smith Sch Business, Finance Dept, 360 Goodes Hall,143 Union St, Kingston, ON K7L 3N6, Canada
[3] Indiana Univ, Kelly Sch Business, Finance Dept, HH 6100,1309 E 10th St, Bloomington, IN 47405 USA
关键词
Bankruptcy; Structural estimation; Conflicts of interest; Asymmetric information; FINANCIAL DISTRESS; ECONOMIC DISTRESS; STOCHASTIC-MODEL; STRATEGIC DELAY; COSTS; REORGANIZATION; INVESTMENT; VALUATION; CHAPTER-7; AUCTIONS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.06.014
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
How efficient is corporate bankruptcy in the United States? Two frictions, asymmetric in-formation and conflicts of interest among creditors, can cause several inefficiencies: ex-cess liquidation, excess continuation, and excess delay. We find large bankruptcy ineffi-ciencies, mainly due to excess delay. Eliminating information asymmetries would increase average total payouts by 4%, and eliminating conflicts of interest would increase them by 18% more. Without these frictions, 14% more cases would be resolved pre-court, and court cases would be 73% shorter. With less delay, bankruptcy's indirect costs would be much lower. In contrast, inefficiencies from excess liquidation and excess continuation are quite small. (c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
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页码:975 / 1000
页数:26
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