Strategy-proof cost sharing under increasing returns: Improvement of the supremal welfare loss

被引：5

作者：

Hashimoto, Kazuhiko ^{[1
]}

Saitoh, Hiroki ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Osaka Univ, Inst Social & Econ Res, Suita, Osaka 565, Japan

[2] Meiji Gakuin Univ, Fac Econ, Tokyo, Japan

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2015年 / 89卷

关键词：

Strategy-proofness; Cost sharing; Increasing returns; Supremal welfare loss; Average cost pricing; Hybrid rule;

D O I：

10.1016/j.geb.2014.12.004

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We consider a mechanism design problem in economies with increasing returns. We construct a new class of rules, called w-hybrid rules, and characterize them by strategy-proofness, anonymity, envy-freeness, consumer sovereignty, and non-bossiness. We show that w-hybrid rules improve the supremal welfare loss compared with the average cost pricing rule (Moulin, 1999 and Moulin and Shenker, 2001). (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：101 / 121

页数：21

共 12 条

[1]

Hashimoto K., 2011, STRATEGY PROOF UNPUB

[2] GROVES SCHEME ON RESTRICTED DOMAINS [J].

HOLMSTROM, B .

ECONOMETRICA, 1979, 47 (05) :1137-1144

[3] Limitations of Cross-Monotonic Cost-Sharing Schemes [J].

Immorlica, Nicole ;

Mahdian, Mohammad ;

Mirrokni, Vahab S. .

ACM TRANSACTIONS ON ALGORITHMS, 2008, 4 (02)

[4]

Juarez R., 2008, OPTIMAL GROUP UNPUB

[5] The worst absolute surplus loss in the problem of commons: random priority versus average cost [J].

Juarez, Ruben .

ECONOMIC THEORY, 2008, 34 (01) :69-84

[6]

Masso J., 2010, STRATEGY PROOF UNPUB

[7] Beyond Moulin mechanisms [J].

Mehta, Aranyak ;

Roughgarden, Tim ;

Sundararajan, Mukund .

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 2009, 67 (01) :125-155

[8] Incremental cost sharing: Characterization by coalition strategy-proofness [J].

Moulin, H .

SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, 1999, 16 (02) :279-320

[9] Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs: budget balance versus efficiency [J].

Moulin, H ;

Shenker, S .

ECONOMIC THEORY, 2001, 18 (03) :511-533

[10] Strategyproofness, Non-Bossiness and Group Strategyproofness in a cost sharing model [J].

Mutuswami, S .

ECONOMICS LETTERS, 2005, 89 (01) :83-88

← 1 2 →