Venture capitalists as principals:: Contracting, screening, and monitoring

被引：267

作者：

Kaplan, SN ^{[1
]}

Strömberg, P ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Chicago, Grad Sch Business, Chicago, IL 60637 USA

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2001年 / 91卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1257/aer.91.2.426

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：426 / 430

页数：5

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