Blessing or curse? Government funding of deposit insurance and corporate lending

被引：2

作者：

Delis, Manthos D. ^{[1
]}

Iosifidi, Maria ^{[2
]}

Papadopoulos, Panagiotis ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Audencia Business Sch, Nantes, France

[2] Montpellier Business Sch, Montpellier, France

[3] Univ Surrey, Guildford, England

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL STABILITY | 2022年 / 61卷

关键词：

Deposit insurance; Deposit Government or private funding; private Lending terms; Syndicated loans; BANK RISK EVIDENCE; MARKET DISCIPLINE; SUPERVISION; INSTITUTIONS; LAWS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jfs.2022.101022

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

A key policy to limit the possibility of bank runs is an explicit deposit insurance scheme, which can be either privately or government funded. Using syndicated loans from 63 countries during the period 1985-2016, we study the effect of government involvement in deposit insurance funding on price and non-price characteristics of loans. We show that changes from purely private-funded to either government-funded or jointly funded deposit insurance increase all-in-spread-drawn by approximately 4.6 %, further increase loan fees, decrease loan maturity, and increase the use of performance pricing provisions. Our findings are consistent with the moral hazard problem behind government-funded deposit insurance schemes.

引用

页数：27

共 63 条

[1] Democracy Does Cause Growth [J].