A characterization of single-peaked preferences via random social choice functions

被引：12

作者：

Chatterji, Shurojit ^{[1
]}

Sen, Arunava ^{[2
]}

Zeng, Huaxia ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Singapore Management Univ, Sch Econ, Singapore 178902, Singapore

[2] Indian Stat Inst, Planning Unit, New Delhi 110016, India

来源：

THEORETICAL ECONOMICS | 2016年 / 11卷 / 02期

关键词：

Random social choice functions; strategy-proofness; compromise; single-peaked preferences; STRATEGY-PROOFNESS; REPLACEMENT PRINCIPLE; SCHEMES; RULES;

D O I：

10.3982/TE1972

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper proves the following result: every path-connected domain of preferences that admits a strategy-proof, unanimous, tops-only random social choice function satisfying a compromise property is single-peaked. Conversely, every single-peaked domain admits a random social choice function satisfying these properties. Single-peakedness is defined with respect to arbitrary trees. The paper provides a justification of the salience of single-peaked preferences and evidence in favor of the Gul conjecture (Barbera 2010).

引用

页码：711 / 733

页数：23

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