Group size and matching protocol in contests

被引：2

作者：

Baik, Kyung Hwan ^{[1
]}

Chowdhury, Subhasish M. ^{[2
]}

Ramalingam, Abhijit ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Sungkyunkwan Univ, Dept Econ, Seoul, South Korea

[2] Univ Bath, Dept Econ, Bath, Avon, England

[3] Appalachian State Univ, Dept Econ, Boone, NC 28608 USA

来源：

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS-REVUE CANADIENNE D ECONOMIQUE | 2021年 / 54卷 / 04期

关键词：

RENT-SEEKING; COOPERATION; COMMUNICATION; PUNISHMENT; ATTITUDES; OLIGOPOLY; COLLUSION; RISK;

D O I：

10.1111/caje.12557

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We investigate the effects of group size and matching protocol in Tullock contest experiments. In a 2 x 2 factorial design, we implement partner and random stranger-matching protocols in contests between two and between three players. Group size does not affect overall absolute bid levels, but the rate of overbidding is lower in two-player groups across matching protocols. Matching protocol does not affect bidding behaviour for three-player groups, but a partner matching reduces both the level and dispersion of bids in two-player groups. These results show the joint effect of group size and matching protocol and suggest that identifiability in repeated play facilitates tacit collusion.

引用

页码：1716 / 1736

页数：21

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