Impulse balance equilibrium and feedback in first price auctions

被引：81

作者：

Ockenfels, A

Selten, R

机构：

[1] Univ Cologne, Dept Econ, D-50923 Cologne, Germany

[2] Univ Bonn, Dept Econ, D-5300 Bonn, Germany

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2005年 / 51卷 / 01期

关键词：

auctions; feedback; learning; overbidding; experiments; ex-post rationality; bounded rationality; social comparison;

D O I：

10.1016/j.geb.2004.04.002

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Experimental sealed-bid first-price auctions with private values in which feedback on the losing bids is provided yield lower revenues than auctions where this feedback is not given. The concept of weighted impulse balance equilibrium, which is based on a principle of ex-post rationality and incorporates a concern for social comparison, captures the data. (c) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：155 / 170

页数：16

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