Existence of Nash equilibria in finite extensive form games with imperfect recall: A counterexample

被引：17
|
作者：
Wichardt, Philipp C. [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Bonn, Dept Econ, D-53113 Bonn, Germany
来源：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2008年 / 63卷 / 01期
关键词：
imperfect recall; Nash equilibrium; existence;
D O I：
10.1016/j.geb.2007.08.007
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper provides an example showing that for finite extensive form games without perfect recall existence of Nash equilibria in behaviour strategies is not guaranteed in general. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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页码：366 / 369
页数：4
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