Existence of Nash equilibria in finite extensive form games with imperfect recall: A counterexample

被引：17

作者：

Wichardt, Philipp C. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Bonn, Dept Econ, D-53113 Bonn, Germany

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2008年 / 63卷 / 01期

关键词：

imperfect recall; Nash equilibrium; existence;

D O I：

10.1016/j.geb.2007.08.007

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper provides an example showing that for finite extensive form games without perfect recall existence of Nash equilibria in behaviour strategies is not guaranteed in general. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：366 / 369

页数：4

共 5 条

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[2] Isbell J, 1957, CONTRIBUTIONS THEORY, P79
[3] EQUILIBRIUM POINTS IN N-PERSON GAMES
NASH, JF
[J]. PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1950, 36 (01) : 48 - 49
[4] On the interpretation of decision problems with imperfect recall
Piccione, M
Rubinstein, A
[J]. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 1997, 20 (01) : 3 - 24
[5] [No title captured]

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