The electoral dynamics of the federal pork barrel

Theory: This paper articulates a model of distributive policy activity that links decreases in the flow of distributive policy benefits to House districts to an increased likelihood that quality challengers will oppose incumbents in primary and/or general elections. Hypotheses: Do electorally vulnerable legislators seek to increase the flow of new awards early in the subsequent electoral cycle in order to help overcome their vulnerability? Do heightened levels of new awards reduce the probability that incumbent legislators will face quality challengers in upcoming primary or general elections? Methods: Congressional district-level data on new awards, where the time from application to final award was less than four months, are regressed on electoral margins, open-seat status, and political action committee campaign contributions for the 100th and 101st Congresses. Results: The flow of new awards early in a Congressional term is higher in districts where the incumbent was elected in an open seat race and when the open seat incumbent was elected by a narrow margin. This is especially true of programs in the Small Business Administration that provide loans and loan guarantees to small businesses. While only a minority of incumbents typically face quality challengers, high levels of new awards early in the Congressional term reduce the likelihood that incumbents will face quality challengers in the subsequent primary or general election. Increases in the number of discretionary awards going to recipients other than small businesses tend to be more useful in fending off quality challengers than loans and loan guarantees from the Small Business Administration.