Desire and self-knowledge

被引：12

作者：

Fernandez, Jordi ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Adelaide, Adelaide, SA 5005, Australia

来源：

AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY | 2007年 / 85卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1080/00048400701676419

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

In this paper, I propose an account of self-knowledge for desires. According to this account, we form beliefs about our own desires on the basis of our grounds for those desires. First, I distinguish several types of desires and their corresponding grounds. Next, I make the case that we usually believe that we have a certain desire on the basis of our grounds for it. Then, I argue that a belief formed thus is epistemically privileged. Finally, I compare this account to two other similar accounts of self-knowledge.

引用

页码：517 / 536

页数：20

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