The nexus of market society, liberal preferences, and democratic peace: Interdisciplinary theory and evidence

被引:46
作者
Mousseau, M [1 ]
机构
[1] Koc Univ, Istanbul, Turkey
关键词
D O I
10.1046/j.0020-8833.2003.00276.x
中图分类号
D81 [国际关系];
学科分类号
030207 ;
摘要
Drawing on literature from Anthropology, Economics, Political Science and Sociology, an interdisciplinary theory is presented that links the rise of contractual forms of exchange within a society with the proliferation of liberal values, democratic legitimacy, and peace among democratic nations. The theory accommodates old facts and yields a large number of new and testable ones, including the fact that the peace among democracies is limited to market-oriented states, and that market democracies-but not the other democracies-perceive common interests. Previous research confirms the first hypothesis; examination herein of UN roll call votes confirms the latter: the market democracies agree on global issues. The theory and evidence demonstrate that (a) the peace among democratic states may be a function of common interests derived from common economic structure; (b) all of the empirical research into the democratic peace is underspecified, as no study has considered an interaction of democracy with economic structure; (C) interests can be treated endogenously in social research; and (d) several of the premier puzzles in global politics are causally related-including the peace among democracies and the association of democratic stability and liberal political culture with market-oriented economic development.
引用
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页码:483 / 510
页数:28
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