Belief and rational indeterminacy

被引：2

作者：

Leonard, Nick ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ San Francisco, San Francisco, CA 94117 USA

来源：

SYNTHESE | 2021年 / 199卷 / 5-6期

关键词：

Belief; Indeterminacy; Anti-expertise; Paradox; Rationality; VAGUENESS;

D O I：

10.1007/s11229-021-03386-z

中图分类号：

N09 [自然科学史]; B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ; 010108 ; 060207 ; 060305 ; 0712 ;

摘要：

This paper is about an anti-expertise paradox that arises because of self-referential sentences like: (*) = I do not believe that (*) is true. The first aim is to motivate, develop, and defend a novel view of epistemic rationality according to which there can be genuine rational indeterminacy, i.e., it can be indeterminate which doxastic states an agent is rationally permitted or required to have. The second aim is to show how this view can provide a solution to this paradox while also avoiding the problems that plague its rivals.

引用

页码：13523 / 13542

页数：20

共 30 条

[1]

Barnes E., 2011, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, V6, P103, DOI DOI 10.1093/ACPROF:OSO/9780199603039.003.0003

[2] Ontic Vagueness: A Guide for the Perplexed [J].