Vote trading and information aggregation

被引：76

作者：

Christoffersen, Susan E. K. ^{[1
]}

Geczy, Christopher C.

Musto, David K.

Reed, Adam V.

机构：

[1] McGill Univ, Montreal, PQ H3A 2T5, Canada

[2] Univ Penn, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA

[3] Univ N Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC 27515 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCE | 2007年 / 62卷 / 06期

关键词：

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROPOSALS; INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS; LARGE SHAREHOLDERS; VOTING-RIGHTS; MARKET; OWNERSHIP; ACTIVISM; PRICES; STOCK;

D O I：

10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01296.x

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

The standard analysis of corporate governance assumes that shareholders vote in ratios that firms choose, such as one share-one vote. However, if the cost of unbundling and trading votes is sufficiently low, then shareholders choose the ratios. We document an active market for votes within the U.S. equity loan market, where the average vote sells for zero. We hypothesize that asymmetric information motivates the vote trade and find support in the cross section. More trading occurs for higher-spread and worse-performing firms, especially when voting is close. Vote trading corresponds to support for shareholder proposals and opposition to management proposals.

引用

页码：2897 / 2929

页数：33

共 39 条

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APFEL RC, 2001, 8618 NBER U ROCH

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Bagehot W., 1971, FIN ANLST J, V27, P12

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