Manufacturer's vertical integration strategies in a three-tier supply chain

被引：28
|
作者：
Li, Wei [1 ]
Chen, Jing [2 ]
机构：
[1] Southwestern Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Business Adm, Chengdu 610072, Peoples R China
[2] Dalhousie Univ, Rowe Sch Business, Kenneth C Rowe Management Bldg,6100 Univ Ave, Halifax, NS B3H 4R2, Canada
来源：
TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH PART E-LOGISTICS AND TRANSPORTATION REVIEW | 2020年 / 135卷
基金：
中国国家自然科学基金; 加拿大自然科学与工程研究理事会;
关键词：
Vertical integration; Three-tier supply chain; Endogenous quality positioning; Vertical quality differentiation; PRICE-COMPETITION; CHANNEL STRUCTURE; PRODUCT QUALITY; ONLINE CHANNEL; COORDINATION; DECISIONS; BACKWARD; MARKETS; DUOPOLY; LINE;
D O I：
10.1016/j.tre.2020.101884
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We develop game-theoretic models to examine the manufacturer's vertical integration strategies in a three-tier supply chain with two suppliers, one manufacturer, and two retailers. The supply chain sells two quality-differentiated products. We find that when quality is exogenous, regardless of the existing supply chain structure, the manufacturer's choice of forward or backward integration strategy depends on the relative efficiencies of two products. When quality is endogenous, however, the existing supply chain structure does affect the manufacturer's integration strategy decision. Although backward integration hurts the unintegrated supplier, forward integration can lead to a win-win outcome for the manufacturer and unintegrated retailer.
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页数：20
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