Link formation in cooperative situations

被引：66

作者：

Dutta, B

van den Nouweland, A

Tijs, S

机构：

[1] Indian Stat Inst, New Delhi 110016, India

[2] 1285 Univ Oregon, Dept Econ, Eugene, OR 97403 USA

[3] Tilburg Univ, Dept Econometr, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands

[4] Tilburg Univ, Ctr Econ Res, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY | 1998年 / 27卷 / 02期

关键词：

link formation; TU game; exogenous solution;

D O I：

10.1007/s001820050070

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In this paper we study the endogenous formation of cooperation structures or communication graphs between players in a superadditive TU game. For each cooperation structure that is formed, the payoffs to the players are determined by an exogenously given solution. We model the process of cooperation structure formation as a game in strategic form. It is shown that several equilibrium refinements predict the formation of the complete cooperation structure or some structure which is payoff-equivalent to the complete structure. These results are obtained for a large class of solutions for cooperative games with cooperation structures.

引用

页码：245 / 256

页数：12