DOES SUCCESS BREED SUCCESS? A QUASI-EXPERIMENT ON STRATEGIC MOMENTUM IN DYNAMIC CONTESTS

被引：36

作者：

Gauriot, Romain ^{[1
]}

Page, Lionel ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] New York Univ Abu Dhabi, Div Social Sci, Abu Dhabi, U Arab Emirates

[2] Univ Technol Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia

来源：

ECONOMIC JOURNAL | 2019年 / 129卷 / 624期

基金：

澳大利亚研究理事会;

关键词：

COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENTS; PSYCHOLOGICAL MOMENTUM; MINIMAX PLAY; DISCONTINUITY; GENDER; EQUILIBRIUM; PERFORMANCE; INCENTIVES; TOURNAMENT; MULTISTAGE;

D O I：

10.1093/ej/uez040

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We study how agents adapt their behaviour to variations of incentives in dynamic contests. We investigate a real dynamic contest with large stakes: professional tennis matches. Situations in which balls bounce very close to the court's lines are used as the setting of a quasi-experiment providing random variations in winning probability. We find evidence of a momentum effect for men whereby winning a point has a positive causal impact on the probability to win the next one. This behaviour is compatible with a reaction to the asymmetry of incentives between leaders and followers. We do not find momentum for women.

引用

页码：3107 / 3136

页数：30

共 67 条

[1] ON THE OPTIMALITY OF LINE CALL CHALLENGES IN PROFESSIONAL TENNIS [J].