共 43 条
Competition and cooperation in mutual fund families
被引:33
作者:
Evans, Richard Burtis
[1
]
Prado, Melissa Porras
[2
]
Zambrana, Rafael
[2
]
机构:
[1] Univ Virginia, Darden Sch Business, Charlottesville, VA 22903 USA
[2] Univ Nova Lisboa, Nova Sch Business & Econ, Campus Carcavelos,Rua Holanda 1, P-2775405 Carcavelos, Portugal
关键词:
Mutual fund;
Manager;
Compensation;
Incentives;
Competition;
Cooperation;
Cross-holding;
Performance;
Cross-subsidization;
Internal capital markets;
INTERNAL CAPITAL-MARKETS;
RISK-TAKING;
PERFORMANCE;
TOURNAMENTS;
MANAGER;
COMPENSATION;
INCENTIVES;
D O I:
10.1016/j.jfineco.2019.09.004
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
Using manager compensation disclosure and intra-family manager cooperation measures, we create indices of family-level competitive/cooperative incentives. Families that encourage cooperation among their managers are more likely to engage in coordinated behavior (e.g., cross-trading and cross-holding) and have less volatile cash flows. Families with competitive incentives generate higher performing funds, a higher fraction of "star" funds, but greater performance dispersion across funds. In examining the determinants of incentive schemes, competitive families are more likely to manage institutional money, and cooperative families are more likely to distribute through brokers, consistent with retail demand for nonperformance characteristics. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码:168 / 188
页数:21
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