Competing Combinatorial Auctions

被引:2
作者
Kittsteiner, Thomas [1 ]
Ott, Marion [2 ]
Steinberg, Richard [3 ]
机构
[1] Rhein Westfal TH Aachen, Sch Business & Econ, D-52056 Aachen, Germany
[2] ZEW Leibniz Ctr European Econ Res, D-68161 Mannheim, Germany
[3] London Sch Econ & Polit Sci, Dept Management, London WC2A 2AE, England
关键词
competing auctioneers; combinatorial auction; electronic marketplace; VCG mechanism; BUNDLING DECISIONS; OFFER AUCTIONS; EQUILIBRIUM; STRATEGIES; SELLERS; DESIGN;
D O I
10.1287/isre.2021.1018
中图分类号
G25 [图书馆学、图书馆事业]; G35 [情报学、情报工作];
学科分类号
1205 ; 120501 ;
摘要
We investigate whether revenue-maximizing auctioneers selling heterogeneous items will allow for combinatorial bidding in the presence of auctioneer competition. We compare the choice of auction format by two competing auctioneers with that of a single auctioneer. Bidders are heterogeneous in their demands, with some having synergies for items. We find that, even if a single auctioneer offers a combinatorial auction, competing auctioneers in a comparable setting will not. Instead, the competing auctioneers will segment the market by restricting allowable package bids in order to increase competition between bidders. This shows that itmight not be advantageous for an onlinemarket platform to offer combinatorial auctions as a design option to competing auctioneers.
引用
收藏
页码:1123 / 1137
页数:8
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