Competing Combinatorial Auctions

被引:2
作者
Kittsteiner, Thomas [1 ]
Ott, Marion [2 ]
Steinberg, Richard [3 ]
机构
[1] Rhein Westfal TH Aachen, Sch Business & Econ, D-52056 Aachen, Germany
[2] ZEW Leibniz Ctr European Econ Res, D-68161 Mannheim, Germany
[3] London Sch Econ & Polit Sci, Dept Management, London WC2A 2AE, England
关键词
competing auctioneers; combinatorial auction; electronic marketplace; VCG mechanism; BUNDLING DECISIONS; OFFER AUCTIONS; EQUILIBRIUM; STRATEGIES; SELLERS; DESIGN;
D O I
10.1287/isre.2021.1018
中图分类号
G25 [图书馆学、图书馆事业]; G35 [情报学、情报工作];
学科分类号
1205 ; 120501 ;
摘要
We investigate whether revenue-maximizing auctioneers selling heterogeneous items will allow for combinatorial bidding in the presence of auctioneer competition. We compare the choice of auction format by two competing auctioneers with that of a single auctioneer. Bidders are heterogeneous in their demands, with some having synergies for items. We find that, even if a single auctioneer offers a combinatorial auction, competing auctioneers in a comparable setting will not. Instead, the competing auctioneers will segment the market by restricting allowable package bids in order to increase competition between bidders. This shows that itmight not be advantageous for an onlinemarket platform to offer combinatorial auctions as a design option to competing auctioneers.
引用
收藏
页码:1123 / 1137
页数:8
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [21] Comparative Analysis of Sequential and Combinatorial Auctions Based on Petri Nets
    Zhang, Xiaodan
    Tang, Huajun
    Yang, Donghai
    El-Meligy, Mohammed A.
    Li, Zhiwu
    IEEE ACCESS, 2018, 6 : 38071 - 38085
  • [22] LABORATORY EXPERIMENTAL COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS IN EDUCATION
    Fiala, Petr
    EFFICIENCY AND RESPONSIBILITY IN EDUCATION 2012, 2012, : 102 - 112
  • [23] Modeling of combinatorial auctions in network economy
    Fiala, Petr
    Flusserova, Lenka
    PROCEEDINGS OF THE 23RD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MATHEMATICAL METHODS IN ECONOMICS 2005, 2005, : 87 - 92
  • [24] Supply Chain Formation by Combinatorial Auctions
    Fiala, Petr
    Korenar, Vaclav
    PROCEEDINGS OF THE 26TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MATHEMATICAL METHODS IN ECONOMICS 2008, 2008, : 99 - 105
  • [25] Approaches to winner determination in combinatorial auctions
    Sandholm, T
    DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS, 2000, 28 (1-2) : 165 - 176
  • [26] Fisheries quota allocation: Laboratory experiments on simultaneous and combinatorial auctions
    Tisdell, J. G.
    Iftekhar, Md Sayed
    MARINE POLICY, 2013, 38 : 228 - 234
  • [27] On the robustness of non-linear personalized price combinatorial auctions
    Schneider, S.
    Shabalin, P.
    Bichler, M.
    EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH, 2010, 206 (01) : 248 - 259
  • [28] An Analysis of Design Problems in Combinatorial Procurement Auctions
    Martin Bichler
    Alexander Pikovsky
    Thomas Setzer
    Business & Information Systems Engineering, 2009, 1 : 111 - 117
  • [29] Strong activity rules for iterative combinatorial auctions
    Harsha, Pavithra
    Barnhart, Cynthia
    Parkes, David C.
    Zhang, Haoqi
    COMPUTERS & OPERATIONS RESEARCH, 2010, 37 (07) : 1271 - 1284
  • [30] Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue
    Eden, Alon
    Feldman, Michal
    Fiat, Amos
    Goldner, Kira
    Karlin, Anna R.
    MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH, 2023, : 653 - 674