Japan's Policy towards North Korea's Nuclear and Missile Program

The paper analyzes the evolution and key components of Japan's policy towards North Korea, its nuclear and missile program in particular, starting from engagement attempts in the 1990s and 2000s and Tokyo's participation in Six-Party Talks. After failed attempts at normalizing relations and settling the issue of DPRK's abduction of Japanese citizens by Prime Minister Koizumi in 2002-2004, Japan has been pursuing a containment policy. With no official relations established and economic contacts effectively severed starting from sanctions adopted in 2006, Japan began to link normalizing relations with North Korea to settling nuclear and missile as well as abduction issues. Framing the perceived threat from the DPRK's nuclear and missile program as the key national and regional security threat, Japan's government including Shinzo Abe has used this "proxy threat" in order to build up its military capabilities, ease post-war restrictions and ensure political support. The paper also looks into the policy of Prime Minister Abe on the DPRK and draws a conclusion that amidst easing tensions and negotiations on the Korean Peninsula Japan is the only party not engaged in the talks with Kim Jong-un due to its hardest position, advocating maximum pressure and sanctions until CVID is reached and continuing to link any economic cooperation and humanitarian assistance with the resolution of nuclear, missile and abduction problems. It also highlights key security concerns of the Abe administration such as the DPRK's short and medium range ballistic missiles that are believed to threaten Japan. In the end it discusses the prospects for Japan to transform its policy towards North Korea.