Uniqueness in symmetric first-price auctions with affiliation

被引：12

作者：

McAdams, David ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] MIT, Sloan Sch Management, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2007年 / 136卷 / 01期

关键词：

first-price auction; uniqueness; affiliation; interdependent values; all-pay auction;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jet.2006.07.002

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The first-price auction has a unique monotone pure strategy equilibrium when there are n symmetric risk-averse bidders having affiliated types and interdependent values. (C) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：144 / 166

页数：23

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